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Abstract
We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-
war without exogenous noise, in which players have the opportunity to
engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each
battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the greater
resources wins. In equilibrium, contest effort concentrates on at most
two adjacent states of the game, the "tipping states", which are de-
termined by the contestants’ relative strengths, their distances to final
victory, and the discount factor. In these states battle outcomes are
stochastic due to endogenous randomization. Both relative strength
and closeness to victory increase the probability of winning the battle
at hand. Patience reduces the role of distance in determining outcomes.
Applications range from politics, economics and sports, to biology,
where the equilibrium behavior finds empirical support: many species
have developed mechanisms such as hierarchies or other organizational
structures by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly
repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation why. Com-
pared to a single stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall
resources that are dissipated among the group of players.
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1 Introduction
Final success or failure in a conflict is often the result of the outcomes of
a series of potential battles. An illustrative example is the decision making
process in many organizations. Resources, jobs and other goods that involve
rents to individuals inside the organization are frequently allocated in a process
that has multiple decision stages. For instance, hiring decisions often involve
a contest between candidates in which a hiring committee makes a decision
and forwards this decision to another committee. This committee approves to
the initial decision and forwards the case further until a final decision stage is
reached, or may return the case to the previous committee. Two competing
candidates could expend effort trying to influence the decision process in each
stage. Such multi-layered decision processes obviously cause delay in decision
making and this can be seen as a cost. We will argue here that, compared to a
single stage decision process in which the rival players spend effort in a single
stage all-pay auction, the multi-stage decision process can be advantageous as
it may improve allocative efficiency and reduce effort that is expended by rival
contestants in the conflict.
In more general terms we describe the multi-stage contest as a tug-of-war.
It consists of a (possibly infinite) sequence of battles between two contestants
who accumulate stage victories, and in which the contestant who first accu-
mulates a sufficiently larger number of such victories than his rival is awarded
the prize for final victory. To our knowledge, Harris and Vickers (1987) were
the first to look formally at the tug-of-war. They analyse an R&D race as a
tug-of-war in which each single battle is determined as the outcome of a con-
test with noise. The exogenous noise allows for deterministic equilibrium effort
choices in each battle, but, at the same time, makes the problem less tractable
and has so far ruled out a fully analytic description of the equilibrium. Budd,
Harris and Vickers (1993) apply a somewhat more complicated stochastic dif-
ferential game approach to a dynamic duopoly, seen as a tug-of-war involving
a continuum of advertizing or R&D battles that determine the firms’ relative
market positions. Using a complementary pair of asymptotic expansions for
extreme parameter values and numerical simulations elsewhere, they isolate
a number of effects that govern the process. Several of these appear in our
analysis which, unlike their framework, derives an analytical solution for the
unique Markov perfect equilibrium. Moreover, our analysis of battles without
noise leads to an equilibrium with mixed strategies and allows us to explicitly
solve for equilibrium for both symmetric and asymmetric environments.
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We examine how the players’ respective fighting abilities, rewards from final
victory, and the distances in terms of the required battle win differential to
achieve victory interact to determine Markov perfect equilibrium behavior in
the tug-of-war. For notational convenience we concentrate on the asymmetry
in the valuations of the final prize and assume equal fighting ability, but as
will be shown this is equivalent to the more general case with asymmetric
valuations of the prize and asymmetric fighting abilities. We show that the
contest effort that is dissipated in total and over all battle periods crucially
depends on the starting point of the tug-of-war, and, for many starting points,
is negligible, even if the asymmetry in the starting conditions is very limited.
The multi-battle structure in a tug-of-war reduces the amount of resources
that is dissipated in the contest, compared to a single all-pay auction, which
has been studied more carefully in the literature. Key references are Hillman
and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1993, 1996) for the case of
complete information, and Amann and Leininger (1995, 1996), Krishna and
Morgan (1997), Kura (1999), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Gavious, Mol-
dovanu and Sela (2002) in the context of incomplete information.1 A repeated
all-pay auction has been considered by McAfee (2000). Apart from the use of
a different tie-breaking rule, a difference between our and his analysis is his
assumption that the final loser in the tug-of-war receives a strictly negative
prize, compared to a loser prize of zero in this paper. With negative loser
prizes, the loser would like to delay final defeat, even if this delay does not im-
ply or open up a chance for this player to turn defeat into victory. In contrast,
with a loser prize of zero, when the tug-of-war ends, the loser sacrifices only
the option to win the winner prize, but does not suffer more from termination
now than from termination tomorrow. With negative loser prizes, contestants
may continue the tug-of-war with negligible fighting effort forever, but the in-
tensity of fighting picks up once the process moves close to final defeat of one
of the contestants. In contrast, with non-negative loser prizes, fighting takes
place only at stages where neither of the contestants has a major advantage.
As a modeling device, the tug-of-war has a large number of applications in
diverse areas of science, including political science, economics, astronomy and
history.2 The term ‘tug-of-war’ has also been used in biology. In the context
1For further applications of the all-pay auction see Arbatskaya (2003), Baik, Kim and
Na (2001), Baye, Kovenock and De Vries (2005), Che and Gale (1998, 2003), Ellingsen
(1991), Kaplan, Luski and Wettstein (2003), Konrad (2004), Moldovanu and Sela (2004),
and Sahuguet and Persico (2005).
2To give a few examples: In politics, Whitford (2005) describes the struggle between the
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of within-group conflict among animals, subjects could struggle repeatedly.3
For instance, the formation of hierarchies and their dynamic evolution oc-
curs in repeated battle contests. As Hemelrijk (2000) describes for several
examples, individuals may try to acquire a high rank, but the differentiation
and asymmetry that is created by this can also reduce future conflict. Win-
ning or losing a particular contest in a series of conflictual situations is known
to change future conflict behavior (Bergman et al. (2003), Beacham (2003)
and Hsu and Wolf (1999)). This may partially be the result of information
about own fighting skills and the fighting experience gained, but it may also
arise from the change in strategic position with respect to future conflict about
rank, territory, access to food, or opportunities to reproduce.
Evidence from biology and political science shows that violent conflict often
does not take place, or, at least, the intensity of a conflict varies significantly
as a function of the conflicting parties’ actual strengths, previous experience,
and the strategic symmetry or asymmetry of the particular situation in terms
of territorial or other advantages. There are probably examples in line with
the result in McAfee, where fighting effort increases when the tug-of-war ap-
proaches one of the end points. However, there are also situations in which
fighting occurs only in an interior state in which the players are sufficiently
symmetric. Parker and Rubenstein (1981) and Hammerstein (1981), for in-
president and legislature about the control of agencies as a tug-of-war. Yoo (2001) refers to
the relations between the US and North-Korea and Organski and Lust-Okar (1997) to the
struggle about the status of Jerusalem as cases of tug-of-war. According to Runciman (1987),
at the time of the Crusades, when various local rulers frequently attacked one another, they
sometimes succeeded in conquering a city or a fortification, only to lose this, or another,
part of their territory to the same, or another, rival ruler later on. The conflict between two
rival rulers can be seen as a sequence of battles. They start at some status quo in which
each rules over a number of territories with fortified areas. They fight each other in battles,
and each battle is concerned with one fortress or territory. In the sequence of successes and
failures, the fortresses or territories are destroyed or reallocated, and the conflict continues
until one of the rulers has lost all his fortresses or territories and is thus finally defeated.
If battle success alternates more or less evenly, then such a contest can go on for a very
long time, possibly even forever. The end comes only when one of the rulers has been more
successful than his rival sufficiently often.
3The term also refers to contests between different species. Ehrenberg and McGrath
(2004) refer to the interaction of microtubule motors, Larsson, Beignon and Bhardwaj (2004)
and Zhou et al. (2004) refer to the interaction between viruses and the dendritic cells or
other parts of the immune system as tugs of war. Tibbetts and Reeve (2000) consider the
role of the amount of reproductive sharing within a group for the likelihood of within-group
conflict among the social wasp Polistes dominulus.
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stance, emphasize the role of asymmetry in determining whether a conflictual
situation turns into a resource wasteful or violent conflict, with symmetry
making fighting more likely. Different advantages and disadvantages may de-
termine the overall asymmetry of a conflictual situation, and counterbalance
or add to each other. Schaub (1995) describes the conflict over food that oc-
curs between long-tailed macaque females. Differences in strength and in the
distances between the animals and the location of the food govern their beha-
vior. Superior strength or dominance of one contestant can be compensated
by a greater distance she has to the location of the food. Relative strength,
together with the actual payoffs from winning determine contestants’ stakes
at any given stage of a tug-of-war and determine the degree of asymmetry
between the rival players.
Our results may contribute to explaining why mechanisms such as hierarch-
ies or other organizational structures have evolved by which the allocation of
prizes is governed by a multi-stage conflict.4 Such structures may delay the
allocation of a given prize, compared to a single stage conflict, but can con-
siderably reduce the overall resources that are dissipated among the group of
players. Compared to a standard all-pay auction, a tug-of-war that is not
rigged in favor of one of the players also improves allocative efficiency; the
probability with which the prize is awarded to the player who values it more
highly is higher in the tug-of-war than in the standard all-pay auction.
In the next section we outline the structure of the tug-of-war and char-
acterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium. In section 3 we discuss the
efficiency properties of the tug-of-war and compare it with the all-pay auction.
Section 4 concludes.
4There are, of course, other explanations for hierarchies more generally, which, however,
focus on different aspects of a hierarchy (see, e.g., the survey in Radner 1992). Radner
(1993) for instance, considers a problem of efficient information aggregation, asking what is
the efficient decision tree. Closer to the issue of allocation of goods in a conflict, Wärneryd
(1998) and Müller and Wärneryd (2001) consider distributional conflict between rival groups
followed by distributional conflict within the winning group as a type of hierarchical conflict.
Both these approaches focus on the "tree-" or "pyramid"-property of hierarchies that reduces
the number of players when moving to the top, whereas our approach does not use this
property. We consider only two contestants throughout and focus on the sequential, repeated
nature of decision process.
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2 The analytics of the tug-of-war
A tug-of-war is a multi-stage game with a potentially infinite horizon which
is characterized by the following elements. The set of players is {A,B}. The
set of states of the war is given by a finite ordered grid of m + 1 points
M ≡ {0, 1, ...m} in R1. The tug-of-war begins at time t = 1 with players
in the intitial state j(1) = mA, 0 < mA < m, which may either be chosen
by nature, or may be a feature of the institutional design. In each period
t = 1, 2, 3... a battle takes place between the players in which A (resp. B)
expends effort at (resp. bt). A victory by player A (B) in state i at time t
moves the war to state i− 1 (i+ 1) at time t+ 1. The state in period t+ 1 is
therefore j(t + 1) = mA + nBt − nAt, where nAt and nBt denote respectively,
the number of battle victories that A and B have accumulated by the end
of period t. This continues as long as the war stays in some interior state
j ∈M int ≡ {1, 2, ..., (m− 1)}. The war ends when one of the players achieves
final victory by driving the state to his favored terminal state, j = 0 and
j = m, for player A and B respectively. A prize (for final victory) of size
ZA > 0 is awarded to A if the terminal state j = 0 is reached, and B receives a
loser prize equal to zero at this state. Alternatively, a winner prize of ZB > 0
is awarded to B if the terminal state j = m is reached, and A receives a loser
prize of zero in this case. Without loss of generality we assume that ZA ≥ ZB.5
states j 
m m-1 mA-1 mA+1 mA 0 1 
 
... ...
Figure 1:
Figure 1 depicts the set of states. PlayerA’s (B’s) period t payoff πA(at, j(t))
(πB(bt, j(t))) is assumed to equal ZA (ZB) if player A (B) is awarded the prize
in that period, and −at (−bt) if t is a period in which effort is expended.6 We
assume that each player maximizes the expected discounted sum of his per-
5Qualitatively similar results can be obtained for sufficiently small but positive loser
prizes. The assumption that the loser prizes are non-negative is crucial for the results. The
analysis with negative loser prizes is carried out in McAfee (2000).
6Since the per-period payoffs do not depend directly on time, we have dropped a time
index.
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period payoffs. Throughout we assume that 0 < δ < 1 denotes the common,
time invariant, discount factor.7
The assumption that the cost of effort is simply measured by the effort
itself is for notational simplicity only. Since a player’s preference over income
streams is invariant with respect to a positive affine transformation of utility,
if player A (B) has a constant unit cost of effort cA (cB) we may normalize
utility by dividing by cA (cB) to obtain a new utility function representing the
same preferences in which the unit cost of effort is 1 but player A (B) has a
prize value ZA/cA (ZB/cB). Therefore, our model with asymmetric prizes can
be interpreted as one with both asymmetric prizes and fighting abilities.
Each single battle in the tug-of-war is a simultaneous move all-pay auction
with complete information. A player’s action in each period in which the state
is interior is his effort, at ∈ [0, K] and bt ∈ [0, K], for A and B, respectively,
where K ≥ ZA.8 The player who spends the higher effort in a period wins the
battle. We choose a deterministic tie-breaking rule for the case in which both
players choose the same effort, by which the ”advantaged” player wins. Given
m, ZA, ZB and δ, we say that player A is advantaged in state j if δ
jZA >
δm−jZB, and B is advantaged if δ
jZA ≤ δm−jZB. We define j0 = min{j ∈
M int
¯¯
δjZA ≤ δm−jZB } where this is non-empty, and j0 = m otherwise: player
B is advantaged for j ∈M int such that j ≥ j0 and A is advantaged otherwise.
If m = 2 and mA = 1, the tug-of-war reduces to the well-known case of
the standard all-pay auction with complete information at time t = 1, as in
Hillman and Riley (1989), Ellingsen (1991) or Baye, Kovenock and deVries
(1996). In this case, one single battle takes place at state j = mA = 1. The
process moves from this state in period 1 to j = 0 or to j = 2 at the beginning
of period 2, and the prize is handed over to A or B, respectively. Accordingly,
the contest at period t = 1 in state j = 1 is over a prize that has a present
value of δZA and δZB for A and B, respectively, and the payoffs in the unique
equilibrium of this game (which are in nondegenerate mixed strategies) are
δ(ZA − ZB) for A and zero for B. In what follows, we consider the case with
m > 2.
For each period t, if a terminal state has not yet been reached by the
beginning of the period, players simultaneously choose efforts with common
7It is straightforward to extend our results to cases in which players have different, time
invariant discount factors δA and δB.
8This upper limit makes the set of possible effort choices compact, but does not lead to
a restriction that could be binding in any equilibrium, as an effort choice larger than ZA in
some period is strictly dominated by a choice of effort of zero in this and all future periods.
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knowledge of the initial state mA and the full history of effort choices, denoted
as (at−1,bt−1) ≡ ((a1, ..., at−1), (b1, ..., bt−1)). Players also know the current
state j(t) of the war and the state in any past period j(τ), τ < t. We define
jt = (j(1), j(2), ...j(t)), where j(1) = mA. Hence, we will summarize the
history at time t along any path which has not yet hit a terminal state by
ht = (at−1,bt−1, jt). We will call such a path a non-terminal period t history
and will denote the set of such histories by Ht. A history of the game that
generates a path that reaches a terminal state at precisely period t is termed
a terminal period t history. Denote the set of terminal period t histories by
T t, and the set of (at−1,bt−1) generating elements of T t by T te .
If for an infinite sequence of effort choices, a = (a1, a2, ...) and b =
(b1, b2, ...) no terminal state is reached in finite time, we will call the cor-
responding history h∞ = (a,b, j) a non-terminal history and denote the set of
such histories as H∞.
Given these constructions, we define a behavior strategy σl for player l ∈
{A,B} as a sequence of mappings σl(ht) : Ht → Σ[0,K], that specifies for
every period t and non-terminal history ht an element of the set of probability
distributions over the feasible effort levels [0, K]. Each behavior strategy profile
σ = (σA, σB) generates for each t a probability distribution over histories in
the set
S
τ≤t T
τ ∪Ht. It also generates a probability distribution over the set
of all feasible paths of the game,
S∞
τ=1 T
τ ∪H∞.
Since we assume that each player’s payoff for the tug-of-war is the expec-
ted discounted sum of his per-period payoffs, the payoff for player A from a
behavioral strategy profile σ is denoted vA(σ) = Eσ(Σt˜t=1δ
t−1πA(at, j(t))) ≡
Eσ(πA(at˜−1,bt˜−1, jt˜)) where t˜ is the hitting time at which a terminal state is
first reached.9 If a terminal state is never reached, t˜ = ∞. Note that for
a given sequence of actions (at˜−1 bt˜−1), t˜ arises deterministically, according
to the non-random transition rule embodied in the all-pay auction, so that
the randomness of t˜ is generated entirely by the non-degenerate nature of the
probability distributions chosen by the behavioral strategies. If ht+1 = (at
bt, jt+1) ∈ T t+1e denotes a sequence of efforts that leads to a terminal state at
precisely period t˜ = t+ 1, then, the payoffs for A and B are
9We adopt a notational convention throughout this paper that the action set available
to each player in a terminal state is the effort level zero, so that for any hitting time t˜,
at˜ = bt˜ = 0. Hence, in these states πA(at, j) and πB(bt, j) include only the prize awarded
to the victor, and we suppress the terms at˜ and bt˜ in the notation Σt˜t=1δt−1πA(at, j(t)) ≡
πA(at˜−1,bt˜−1, jt˜).
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πA((at,bt, jt+1)) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−
tX
i=1
δi−1ai +δ
tZA if j(t+ 1) = 0
−
tX
i=1
δi−1ai if j(t+ 1) = m
(1)
and, respectively,
πB((at,bt, jt+1)) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
−
tX
i=1
δi−1ai +δ
tZB if j(t+ 1) = m
−
tXˆ
i=1
δi−1ai if j(t+ 1) = 0.
(2)
If for an infinite sequence of effort choices, a = (a1, a2, ...) and b = (b1, b2, ...)
no terminal state is reached in finite time, payoffs are
πA((a,b, j)) = −
∞X
t=1
δt−1at and πB((a,b, j)) = −
∞X
t=1
δt−1bt.
For a given behavior strategy profile σ = (σA, σB) each player’s payoff in the
tug-of-war can be derived from calculating the expected sum of discounted
per period payoffs generated by the probability distribution over histories in
the set
S∞
τ=1 T
τ ∪ H∞. Moreover, for any t and ht ∈ Ht, one may define
each player’s expected discounted value of future per-period payoffs (discoun-
ted back to time t) conditional on the history ht by deriving the conditional
distribution induced byσ|ht over
S∞
τ=t+1 T
τ ∪ H∞. We shall refer to this as
a player’s continuation value conditional on ht and denote it by vi(σ |ht ) =
Eσ|ht(Σt˜s=tδ
s−tπA(as, j(s))). Note that this has netted out any expenditures
accrued on the history ht.
Since the players’ objective functions are additively separable in the per-
period (time invariant) payoffs and transitions probabilities depend only upon
the current state and actions, continuation payoffs from any sequence of cur-
rent and future action profiles depend on past histories only through the
current state j. It therefore seems natural to restrict attention to Markov
strategies that depend only on the current state j and examine the set of
Markov perfect equilibria. Indeed, this partition of histories is that obtained
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from the more formal analysis of the determination of the Markov partition
in Maskin and Tirole (2001). For any t, we may partition past (non-terminal)
histories in Ht by the period t state j(t), inducing a partition Ht(·), and define
the collection of partitions, H(·) ≡ {Ht(·)}∞t=1. It can be demonstrated that in
our game the vector of collections (HA(·), HB(·)) = (H(·), H(·)) is the unique
maximally coarse consistent collection (the Markov collection of partitions) in
the sense of Maskin and Tirole (2001, p. 201). For any time t, the current state
j(t) therefore constitutes what they call the payoff-relevant history. Since our
game is stationary, we may partition the set of all finite non-terminal histories
by the same state variables, j ∈M int ≡ {1, 2, ...(m−1)}, removing any depend-
ence of the partition on the time t. We label this partition {j(t) = i}i∈Mint.
This is the stationary partition defined by Maskin-Tirole, (2001, p. 203).
In the continuation, we restrict attention to (stationary) Markov strategies
measurable with respect to the payoff relevant history determined by the sta-
tionary partition {j(t) = i}i∈Mint. A stationary Markov strategy σl for player
l ∈ {A,B} is a mapping σl(j) :M int → Σ[0,K], that specifies for every interior
state j a probability distribution over the set of feasible effort levels [0, K].
If in the continuation game starting in period t and state j, σ = (σA, σB) is
played, then the continuation value for player i at t is denoted as vi(σ |j ) and
can be calculated as the discounted sum of future expected period payoffs in
a well-defined manner similar to that described above.
In this context we are interested in deriving the set of Markov perfect
equilibria; that is a pair of Markov strategies that constitute mutually best
responses for all feasible histories. In Propositions 1-3 below we demonstrate
that the tug-of-war has a unique Markov perfect equilibrium for any combin-
ation of mA,m,ZA, ZB and δ.
Before stating these propositions, it is useful to derive some simple proper-
ties that must hold in any Markov perfect equilibrium of our model. Suppose
σ∗ = (σ∗A, σ
∗
B) is a Markov perfect equilibrium and denote player i’s continu-
ation value in state j under σ∗ by vi(σ∗ |j ) = vi(j). Subgame perfection and
stationarity imply that competition in any state j, j ∈ {1, 2, ...m − 1}, may
be viewed as an all-pay auction with prize zA(j) = δvA(j− 1)− δvA(j+1) for
player A and zB(j) = δvB(j+1)− δvB(j−1) for player B. In equilibrium, the
continuation value to player l of being in state j at time t is equal to the sum
of the value of conceeding the prize without a fight (and thereby moving one
state away from the player’s desired terminal state) and the value of engaging
in an all-pay auction with prizes zA(j) = δvA(j − 1)− δvA(j + 1) for player A
and zB(j) = δvB(j+1)−δvB(j−1) for player B. An immediate consequence of
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the characterization of the unique equilibrium in the two-player all-pay auction
with complete information (see Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock,
and De Vries (1996)) is that local stategies are uniquely determined and the
continuation value for the two players in any state j ∈ {1, ...m − 1} at any
time t is
vA(j) = δvA(j + 1) + max(0, zA(j)− zB(j)) = δvA(j + 1)+
+max(0, δ[(vA(j − 1)− vA(j + 1))− (vB(j + 1)− vB(j − 1))])
(3)
and
vB(j) = δvB(j − 1) + max(0, zB(j)− zA(j)) = δvB(j − 1)+
+max(0, δ[(vB(j + 1)− vB(j − 1))− (vA(j − 1)− vA(j + 1))]).
(4)
Rearranging (3) and (4) we obtain
vA(j) = δvA(j+1)+max(0, δ[(vA(j−1)+vB(j−1))− (vA(j+1)+vB(j+1))])
(5)
and
vB(j) = δvB(j−1)+max(0, δ[(vA(j+1)+vB(j+1))−(vA(j−1)+vB(j−1))])
(6)
Note that the first summand in (5) and (6) is the discounted value of losing
the contest at j and the second summand in each of these expressions is the
expected gain arising from the contest at j. For at least one player this gain
will be zero and for the other player it will be non-negative and strictly positive
as long as J(j − 1) 6= J(j + 1), where J(l) ≡ vA(l) + vB(l) is the joint present
value of being in state l.
Three immediate implications of the above construction are
(i) zA(j) − zB(j) ≥ 0 if and only if J(j − 1) − J(j + 1) ≥ 0 with strict
inequality in one if and only if in the other.
(ii) zA(j)−zB(j) ≥ 0 if and only if vB(j) = δvB(j−1) and zA(j)−zB(j) ≤ 0
if and only if vA(j) = δvA(j + 1).
(iii) If zA(j)− zB(j) ≥ 0 then vA(j) = δ[vA(j − 1) + vB(j − 1))− vB(j + 1)],
and if zA(j)−zB(j) ≤ 0 then vB(j) = δ[vA(j+1)+vB(j+1))−vA(j−1)].
By assumption 0 and m are terminal states so that vA(0) = ZA ≥ ZB =
vB(m) and vA(m) = vB(0) = 0. Moreover, since player A can only receive a
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positive payoff in the state 0, player B can only receive a positive payoff in
the statem, and both players have available the opportunity to always expend
zero effort, in any Markov perfect equilibrium the following inequalities hold
for all j:
0 ≤ vA(j) ≤ δjZA (7)
0 ≤ vB(j) ≤ δm−jZB (8)
and
vA(j) + vB(j) ≤ max(δjZA, δm−jZB) (9)
We can now prove the following
Proposition 1 Consider a tug-of-war with m ≥ 3. Suppose j0 ∈ {2, ...m−1}
exists such that
δj0−1ZA > δ
m−(j0−1)ZB and δj0ZA < δm−j0ZB. (10)
Then a unique Markov perfect equilibrium exists which is characterized as fol-
lows:
For all interior states j /∈ {j0 − 1, j0}, the equilibrium effort choices are
a(j) = b(j) = 0. Only at j0 − 1 and j0 does a battle with a positive probability
of stricty positive effort choices take place. Payoffs for A in the continuation
game at j are δjZA for j < j0−1, 1(1−δ2) [δ
j0−1ZA−δm−(j0−1)ZB] for j = j0−1,
and 0 for j ≥ j0; payoffs for B are δm−jZB for j > j0, 1(1−δ2) [δ
m−j0ZB−δj0ZA]
for j = j0 and 0 for j ≤ j0 − 1.
Proof. We consider existence here and relegate the proof of uniqueness
to the Appendix. We consider the following candidate equilibrium: For all
interior states j /∈ {j0− 1, j0}, the effort choices are a(j) = b(j) = 0. At j0− 1
and j0 players choose efforts according to cumulative distribution functions Fj
and Gj for players A and B in states j as follows:
Fj0−1(a) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a
δ
(1−δ2)∆
j0
BA
for a ∈ [0, δ∆
j0
BA
(1−δ2) ]
1 for a > δ∆
j0
BA
(1−δ2)
(11)
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Gj0−1(b) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1−
δ
(1−δ2)∆
j0
BA
δδj0−2ZA
+ b
δδj0−2ZA
for b ∈ [0, δ∆
j0
BA
(1−δ2) ]
1 for b > δ∆
j0
BA
(1−δ2)
(12)
Fj0(a) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1−
δ
(1−δ2) ∆
j0−1
AB
δδm−(j0+1)ZB
+ a
δδm−(j0+1)ZB
for a ∈ [0, δ ∆
j0−1
AB
(1−δ2) ]
1 for a > δ ∆
j0−1
AB
(1−δ2)
(13)
and
Gj0(b) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b
δ
(1−δ2) ∆
j0−1
AB
for b ∈ [0, δ ∆
j0−1
AB
(1−δ2) ]
1 for b > δ ∆
j0−1
AB
(1−δ2) .
(14)
where
∆
j0
BA = [δ
m−j0ZB − δj0ZA] and ∆j0−1AB = [δj0−1ZA − δm−(j0−1)ZB]. (15)
Note first that this equilibrium candidate has the properties described in
Proposition 1. Players’ continuation values can be stated as functions of the
respective state j as follows:
vA(j) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
δjZA for j < j0 − 1
1
(1−δ2) [δ
j0−1ZA − δm−(j0−1)ZB] for j = j0 − 1
0 for j ≥ j0
(16)
and
vB(j) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
δm−jZB for j > j0
1
(1−δ2) [δ
m−j0ZB − δj0ZA] for j = j0
0 for j ≤ j0 − 1.
(17)
These constitute the payoffs stated in the proposition. For 0 < j < j0 − 1,
player A wins the next j battles without any effort. This takes j periods and
explains why the value of the final prize must be discounted to δjZA. Also,
B does not expend effort in these j battles and finally loses after j battles.
Hence, B’s payoff is equal to zero. For m > j > j0, players A and B simply
switch roles.
Turn now to the states j0 − 1 and j0 as in Figure 2. We call these states
"tipping states", because of their pivotal role in determining the outcome of
the contest. Consider j0− 1. From there, if A wins, the game moves to j0− 2
with continuation values vA(j0 − 2) = δj0−2ZA and vB(j0 − 2) = 0. If B
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Figure 2:
wins, the game moves to j0 with continuation values vA(j0) = 0 and vB(j0).
Assuming that δj0−2ZA > vB(j0) (which can be confirmed later), and applying
the results on the standard all-pay auction, the continuation values are
vA(j0 − 1) = zA(j0 − 1)− zB(j0 − 1) = δ[δj0−2ZA − vB(j0)] (18)
and vB(j0−1) = 0, where zA(j0−1) and zB(j0−1) denote the prizes that A and
B respectively attribute to winning the battle at j0−1, given the continuation
of the game as described in the candidate equilibrium. Similarly, at j0, if A
wins, the game moves to j0 − 1 with continuation values vA(j0 − 1) as in (18)
and vB(j0 − 1) = 0. If B wins, the game moves to j0 + 1 with continuation
values vA(j0+1) = 0 and vB(j0+1) = δ
m−(j0+1)ZB. This yields a continuation
value for player B of
vB(j0) = zB(j0)− zA(j0) = δ[δm−(j0+1)ZB − vA(j0 − 1)], (19)
and vA(j0) = 0. The solution to this system of equations yields the positive
equilibrium values in the middle lines of (16) and (17), and the zero continu-
ation value in the respective state for the other player.
It remains to be shown that the choices described in the candidate equilib-
rium indeed describe equilibrium behavior. The one-stage deviation principle
applies here.10 The continuation values (16) and (17) can be used to consider
one-stage deviations for A and for B.
A deviation b0(j) > 0 at a state 0 < j < j0−1 changes the path frommoving
to j − 1 in the next period to j + 1. However, vB(j − 1) = vB(j + 1) = 0 .
10To confirm this it is sufficient to show that the condition of continuity at infinity is
fulfilled for this game. We may then apply Theorem 4.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1993).
This condition requires that the supremum of the payoff difference that can emerge from
strategies that differ after period t converges to zero as t → ∞. However, a supremum for
this is δt[Zi + 11−δK] for i = A,B, and this converges to zero as t→∞.
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Hence, this deviation reduces B’s payoff by b0(j) compared to b(j) = 0. A
deviation b0(j) > 0 at j > j0 does not change the state in t + 1 compared to
b(j) = 0 in the candidate equilibrium, due to the tiebreaking rule employed.
The deviation reduces B’s payoff by b0(j) compared to b(j) = 0. An equivalent
logic applies for a(j) at states j /∈ {j0 − 1, j0}.
Turn now to the state j0. In the candidate equilibrium, in state j0 contest-
ant A randomizes on the support [0, δ
(1−δ2) [δ
j0−1ZA−δm−(j0−1)ZB]]. All actions
in the equilibrium support for A at j0 yield the same expected payoff equal to
Gj0(x)δvA(j0 − 1) + (1−Gj0(x))0− x = 0. A possible one-stage deviation for
A at j0 is an a0(j0) > δ(1−δ2) [δ
j0−1ZA − δm−(j0−1)ZB]. Compared to the action
a(j0) = δ(1−δ2) [δ
j0−1ZA − δm−(j0−1)ZB] that is inside A’s equilibrium support,
this also leads to state j0−1, but costs the additional amount a0(j0)−a(j0) > 0.
The deviation is therefore not profitable for A. The same type of argument
applies for b(j0).
A similar argument applies to the state j0−1. In the candidate equilibrium,
in state j0 − 1 contestant A randomizes on the support [0, δ(1−δ2)(δ
m−j0ZB −
δj0ZA)]. All actions in the equilibrium support for A at j0 − 1 yield the
same expected payoff equal to Gj0−1(x)δvA(j0 − 2) + (1 − Gj0−1(x))0 − x =
1
1−δ2 [δ
j0−1ZA − δm−(j0−1)ZB] = vA(j0 − 1).11 A possible one-stage deviation
for A at j0 − 1 is an a0(j0 − 1) > δ(1−δ2) [δ
m−j0ZB − δj0ZA]. Compared to the
action a(j0 − 1) = δ(1−δ2) [δ
m−j0ZB − δj0ZA] that is the upper bound of A’s
equilibrium support, this also leads to state j0 − 2, but costs the additional
amount a0(j0 − 1)− a(j0 − 1) > 0. The deviation is not profitable for A. The
same type of argument applies for b(j0 − 1).
Intuitively, outside of the states j0−1 and j0, one of the players is indifferent
between winning and losing the component contest. For instance, in the state
j0 − 2, the best that player B could achieve by winning the next component
contest is to enter the state j0− 1 at which B’s continuation value is still zero
and smaller than player A’s continuation value. As B does not gain anything
from reaching j0− 1, B should not spend any effort trying to reach this state.
But if B does not spend effort to win, it is easy for A to win.
The states j0 − 1 and j0 are different. Battle victory or defeat at one of
these points leads to different continuation games and allocates a considerable
11More formally, all actions in the support of A’s equilibrium local strategy that are not
mass points of B’s local strategy yield the same expected payoff. Since B has a mass point
at zero, this does not hold at a = 0, but for every a in a neigborhood above zero.
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rent between A and B. This makes competition particularly strong at these
states. We call these states "tipping states" because success of an advantaged
player at each of these two states "tips" the game so that victory is obtained
without further effort. A loss by the advantaged player throws the system
back into a competitive state where the player becomes disadvantaged.
Proposition 1 also shows that the allocation of a prize in a tug-of-war leads
to a seemingly peaceful outcome whenever the conflict starts in a state other
than a tipping state. This will be important for drawing conclusions in section
3 about the efficiency properties of a tug-of-war as an allocation mechanism.
Proposition 1 does not consider all possible parameter cases. Before turning
to the remaining cases, note that the case j0 = 1 cannot emerge, as this requires
δZA < δ
m−1ZB, and this contradicts ZA ≥ ZB for m > 2. However, player A’s
dominance could be sufficiently large that no interior j0 exists that has the
properties defined in Proposition 1. This leads to
Proposition 2 Suppose that δm−1ZA > δZB. Then a unique Markov perfect
equilibrium exists with vB(j) = 0 and vA(j) = δ
jZA for all j ∈ {1, ...,m− 2},
and vA(m− 1) = δm−1ZA − δZB and vB(m− 1) = 0 at j = m− 1.
Proof. We show that the following effort choices constitute an equilibrium
and yield the payoffs described in the proposition. Uniqueness follows the
argument in the Appendix.
Effort is a(j) = b(j) = 0 for all j ∈M int\{m−1} and for j = m−1 efforts
are chosen according to the following cumulative distribution functions:
Fm−1(a) =
½
a
δZB
for a ∈ [0, δZB]
1 for a > δZB
(20)
Gm−1(b) =
½
(1− δZB−b
δm−1ZA
) for b ∈ [0, δZB]
1 for b > δZB.
(21)
Note that this behavior yields the payoffs that are characterized in Proposition
2. For states j = 1, 2, ..., (m − 2), A wins after j further battles, and none
of the players expends effort. This confirms vA(j) = δjZA and vB(j) = 0 for
all j = 1, ...m − 2. For j = m, the payoffs are vA(m) = 0 and vB(m) = ZB.
Finally, for j = m− 1, given the mixed strategies described by (20) and (21),
the payoffs are vA(m− 1) = δm−1ZA > δZB and vB(m− 1) = 0.
Now we confirm that the effort choices in the candidate equilibrium are
indeed mutually optimal replies. For interior states j < m − 1, a deviation
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b0(j) > 0 makes B win the battle, instead of A. It leads to j + 1, instead of
j− 1, but vB(j+1) = vB(j− 1) = 0 . Hence, this deviation reduces B’s payoff
by b0(j) compared to b(j) = 0. For A, for j < m − 1, contestant A reaches
j = 0 along the shortest possible series of battle victories and does not spend
any effort. Any positive effort can therefore only decrease A’s payoff. For j =
m − 1, the battle either leads to j = m where B finally wins the prize, or
to j = m − 2. The values the players attribute to reaching these states are
vA(m) = 0, vB(m) = ZB, and vA(m− 2) = δm−2ZA and vB(m− 2) = 0. Using
the results in Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996)
on a complete information all-pay auction with prizes δ[δm−2ZA−0] = δm−1ZA
for A and δ[ZB−0] = δZB for B, it is confirmed that (20) and (21) describe the
unique equilibrium cumulative distribution functions of effort for this all-pay
auction.
Proposition 2 shows that a very strong player has a positive continuation
value regardless of the interior state in which the tug-of-war starts and wins
with probability 1 without expending effort for every interior state except
j = m− 1.
So far we have ruled out the case of equality of continuation values at
interior states, and we turn to this case now which exhausts the set of possible
cases.
Proposition 3 The tug-of-war with δj0ZA = δ(m−j0)ZB ≡ Z for some j0 ∈
{2, ...(m−1)} has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which players spend
a(j) = b(j) = 0 in all interior states j 6= j0. They choose efforts a(j) and b(j)
at j = j0 from the same uniform distribution on the range [0, Z]. Payoffs are
vA(j) = δ
jZA and vB(j) = 0 for j < j0, vA(j) = 0 and vB(j) = δ
m−jZB for
j > j0 and vA(j) = vB(j) = 0 for j = j0.
Proof. We again construct an equilibrium to demonstrate existence. Unique-
ness follows from arguments similar to those appearing in the Appendix.
In the candidate equilibrium each contestant expends zero effort at any
state j 6= j0 and expends effort at j = j0 according to a draw from the
distribution
F (x) =
½
x
Z
for x ∈ [0, Z]
1 for x > Z.
(22)
At j = j0 the expected effort of each player equals Z/2, and each wins this
battle with a probability of 1/2 and, in this case, eventually wins the overall
contest j0 − 1 or (m − j0) − 1 periods later, respectively, without spending
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any further effort. This determines the continuation values in the candidate
equilibrium. These continuation values are
vA = vB = 0 if j = j0
vA = δ
jZA and vB = 0 if j < j0
vA = 0 and vB = δm−jZB if j > j0.
(23)
It remains to show that the candidate equilibrium describes mutually op-
timal replies. Consider one-stage deviations for A and B for some state j < j0.
A choice a0(j) > 0 will not change the equilibrium outcome in the battle in this
period and hence will simply reduce A’s payoff by a0(j). A choice b0(j) > 0 will
make B win. If j < j0 − 1, following the candidate equilibrium A will simply
win a series of battles until final victory occurs. Hence, b0(j) > 0 reduces B’s
payoff by this same amount b0(0) of effort. If j = j0−1, B’s battle victory will
lead to j = j0, and candidate equilibrium play from here on will yield a payoff
equal to zero to B. Accordingly, the deviation b0(j) > 0 yields a reduction
of B’s payoff by this same amount. Consider one-stage deviations for A and
B in some state j > j0. The same line of argument applies, with A and B
switching roles. Finally, consider one-stage deviations for A and B at j = j0.
Any such deviation for A must be a choice a0(j) > Z. Compared to a(j) = Z,
this choice makes A win with the same probability 1, but yields a reduction
in A’s payoff by a0(j)−Z, compared to a(j) = Z. The same argument applies
for deviations by B at this state.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. The two contestants enter into
a very strong fight whenever they reach the state j = j0. In this state they
are perfectly symmetric and they anticipate that the winner of the battle in
this state moves straight to final victory. In the battle that takes place in this
case, they dissipate the maximum feasible rent from winning this battle. This
maximum rent is what they get if they can move from there through a series
of uncontested battles to final victory. Once one of the contestants, say A , has
acquired some advantage in the sense that the contest has moved to j < j0, the
only way for B to reach victory passes through the state with j = j0. As all
rent is dissipated in the contest that takes place there, B is simply not willing
to spend any effort to move the contest to that state. Hence, the considerable
effort that is spent at the point at which the tug-of-war becomes symmetric
in terms of the prizes that are at stake for the two contestants prevents the
contestant who is lagging behind in terms of battle victories from spending
positive effort.
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Discounting played two important roles in our analysis. First, discounting
leads to payoff functions that are continuous at infinity, allowing the applica-
tion of the one-stage deviation principle, which greatly facilitates our proofs.
Moreover, discounting is essential in giving a meaningful role to the distance
to the state with final victory. The following holds:
Proposition 4 For a given value of ZA
ZB
> 1, the tipping state j0 is an in-
creasing step function of δ. Moreover, as δ → 1, A wins the tug-of-war without
effort starting from any state j < m− 1.
Proof. The tipping state j0 is by definition the smallest state j for which
player B is advantaged: j0 = min{j ∈M int
¯¯
δjZA ≤ δm−jZB } when this set is
non-empty, and j0 = m otherwise. For δ > 0, the inequality δ
jZA ≤ δm−jZB
is equivalent to δ2j−mZA ≤ ZB. Sincem ≥ 3, for δ sufficiently close to zero the
inequality is clearly satisfied for j = m − 1, so that j0 is interior. Moreover,
since δ2j−m ≥ 1 for j ≤ m
2
, it must be the case that j0 > m2 . As δ → 1, the
inequality is violated at all interior states, even at j = m − 1. In this case,
by definition j0 = m, and from Proposition 2 player A wins the war from
any state j < m − 1. For any 0 < δ < 1, δ2j−mZA ≤ ZB is equivalent to
2j − m ≥
log
ZB
ZA
log δ
, so that j0 is the smallest index j satisfying the inequality.
Since the left hand side of this inequality is positive, and both the numerator
and denominator of the right hand side are negative, as δ increases, the right
hand side monotonically increases, eventually diverging to∞ as δ → 1. Hence,
as δ increases, the smallest index j satisfying the inequality must increase in
steps until it hits m.
As the discount factor increases, relative prize value or player strength
plays a greater role in the determination of the outcome than distance. For
any given value of ZB
ZA
< 1, as δ increases the tipping state j0 moves in discrete
jumps towards m. Player A may suffer a greater distance disadvantage and
still win the prize with certainty.
3 Expenditure, allocative efficiency and the
cost of delay
The tug-of-war with m > 2 resolves the allocation problem along a sequence
of states, where a violent battle may, but need not take place at each state.
Only in the tipping states is positive effort expended with positive probability.
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Once the process leaves the tipping states, the war moves to a terminal state,
without further effort being expended. A tug-of-war that starts in a tipping
state will therefore be called "violent". A tug-of-war that starts outside a
tipping state will be called "peaceful".
Compared to the standard all-pay auction, the tug-of-war could be inter-
preted as an institution that saves cost of effort in the problem of allocating a
prize between rivals who are prepared to expend resources in fighting for the
prize. Suppose for instance that ZA and ZB are independent random draws
from a continuous distribution with support [0, κ], where κ < K. Suppose that
these values are known to the contestants but are not observable by the de-
signer of the institution at the time that it must be implemented. Consider
the following tug-of-war as an anonymous mechanism in the case in which m
is an even number, so that m
2
is integer valued. Start the tug-of-war in the
symmetric state m
2
and assume, as we have throughout, that player A attempts
to move the state to j = 0 and player B attempts to move the state to j = m.
Then the following result derives the probability of peaceful resolution:
Proposition 5 Let Γ(g) be the continuous cumulative distribution function
of g ≡ ZA/ZB, with support [0,∞]. The allocation is peaceful in the Markov
perfect equilibrium with a probability Γ(δ2) + (1− Γ( 1
δ2
)), and limδ→1(Γ(δ
2) +
(1− Γ( 1
δ2
))) = 1.
Proof. For a proof we show that Γ(δ2)+(1−Γ( 1
δ2
)) is the probability that
the symmetric state m/2 is not a tipping state. Suppose that g > 1
δ2
. Then
ZA > ZB and δ
m
2
+1ZA > δ
m−(m
2
+1)ZB. Hence, j0 − 1 > m2 . By Propositions
1-3 this implies that the tug-of-war that starts in m/2 consecutively moves to
j = 0 with no effort being expended. Let g < δ2. Then ZA < ZB. Applying
the results in Propositions 1-3 with A and B and j = 0 and j = m switching
roles shows that the tug-of-war that starts in m/2 moves to j = m with
no effort being expended. Suppose now that g ∈ (1, 1
δ2
). In this case j0 −
1 = m/2. Accordingly, a battle with positive expected efforts takes place at
m/2 if δ
m
2
+1ZA 6= δm−(m2 +1)ZB. No expected effort is expended in this case
only if δ
m
2
+1ZA = δ
m−(m
2
+1)ZB. However, the set of values of g for which
δ
m
2
+1ZA = δ
m−(m
2
+1)ZB holds has a measure of zero. A similar argument
applies for g ∈ (δ2, 1), again with A and B and j = 0 and j = m switching
roles.
Proposition 5 characterizes conditions on the asymmetry in the valuations
of the prize that are sufficient to make the tug-of-war evolve peacefully if it
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starts in the symmetric state j = m/2. A sufficient condition for this to happen
is that j = m
2
is not a tipping state. If tipping states are j0 and j0 − 1 with
j0 − 1 > m/2 then the equilibrium process moves from j = m2 further away
from the tipping states towards the terminal state j = 0. If ZA < ZB, and,
hence, tipping states are j0 and j0+1, with j0+1 < m/2, then the equilibrium
process moves further away from these states and towards the terminal state
j = m.
Note that the number of states is irrelevant for whether the tug-of-war
that starts in state j = m
2
is resolved peacefully or not, provided that m > 2.
Whether the tug-of-war is resolved peacefully or not depends only on the ratio
of the two prizes and the discount factor. For a given continuous distribution
of g, as the discount factor becomes large, the tug-of-war is resolved almost
surely peacefully.
Of course, offsetting the potential gains from the tug-of-war in promoting
the peaceful resolution of resource contests are the potential costs of delay
arising from the multi-stage nature of the conflict. The all-pay auction is
resolved in a single stage (m = 2) and hence reduces this delay to the minimum
attainable in a non-trivial contest. On the other hand, from Proposition 5 it is
apparent that adding more states beyond m = 4 does not increase the chance
of peaceful resolution and only adds potential delay when a peaceful outcome
arises. Moreover, if m
2
is a tipping state, for a given draw of ZA and ZB the
sum of expected payoffs at this state is simply
δm/2
1− δ2
max{(ZA − ZB), (ZB − ZA)} (24)
which is a strictly decreasing function in m. We state this as
Proposition 6 The sum of expected payoffs in the tug-of-war with m ≥ 4
which have a symmetric state m
2
is maximized at m = 4.
Using Proposition 5 we may compare the cases m = 2 and m = 4. When
m = 4 we know that there is a probability Γ(δ2) + (1 − Γ(δ−2)) that the
allocation is peaceful and a probability of Γ(δ−2)−Γ(δ2) that the allocation is
violent. We know that in the case m = 2 the allocation is always violent and
the sum of the players’ payoffs is δ(Z(1)−Z(2)), where Z(1) ≡ max(ZA, ZB) and
Z(2) ≡ min(ZA, ZB). Ignoring discounting, the loss due to conflict, Z(2), can be
decomposed into the expected loss due to effort expended, 1
2
Z(2)[1+(Z(2)/Z(1))],
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and the expected loss due to misallocation of the prize, 1
2
Z(2)[1− (Z(2)/Z(1))].
The loss due to delay then comes when the factor δ is applied.
In the case where m = 4 the allocation is peaceful when (Z(1)/Z(2)) > δ
−2.
In this case, starting from the state m
2
= 2 it takes two periods for the player
with the higher value to win and no effort is expended. Hence, the sum of the
payoffs of the two players in this case is δ2Z(1). The only inefficiency in this
case is due to delay. For realizations of (ZA, ZB) satisfying (Z(1)/Z(2)) > δ
−2,
the tug-of-war is more efficient than the all-pay auction if and only if δ2Z(1) >
δ(Z(1)−Z(2)) or, equivalently, (Z(1)/Z(2)) < (1− δ)−1. Since by assumption we
are in the range where the tug-of-war is peaceful, (Z(1)/Z(2)) > δ
−2. Note that
δ−2 > (1 − δ)−1 if δ < δ+ ≡
√
5−1
2
. In this case, the all-pay auction is more
efficient than the tug-of-war in this range of values of (Z(1)/Z(2)). For δ > δ
+,
δ−2 < (1 − δ)−1 and the tug-of-war is more efficient than the all-pay auction
for values of (Z(1)/Z(2)) in the interval (δ
−2, (1− δ)−1) and the all-pay auction
is more efficient for values of (Z(1)/Z(2)) in the interval ((1− δ)−1,∞).
When 1 ≤ (Z(1)/Z(2)) < δ−2, in the tug-of-war the state m2 is a tipping state
and the allocation involves active effort expenditure. The expected sum of the
payoffs in this case can again be compared to those in the all-pay auction. For
m = 4 the expected sum of the payoffs in the tug-of-war can be calculated
from equation (24) and is equal to δ
2
1−δ2 (Z(1) − Z(2)). Comparing this to the
expected sum of payoffs in the all-pay auction we find that for Z(1) 6= Z(2),
δ2
1−δ2 (Z(1)−Z(2)) > δ(Z(1)−Z(2)) if and only if δ
2+δ−1 > 0 or δ > δ+ ≡
√
5−1
2
.
Therefore, when the realization of (ZA, ZB) is such that the initial state m2
is a violent state in the tug-of-war, the tug-of-war is more efficient than the
all-pay auction when δ > δ+ and the all-pay auction is more efficient than the
tug-of-war when δ < δ+.
We may summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 When δ < δ+ =
√
5−1
2
, for any realization of (ZA, ZB), the
all-pay auction (m = 2) is more efficient than a tug-of-war with m = 4. When
δ > δ+ the tug-of-war with m = 4 is more efficient than the all-pay auction
for (ZA, ZB) such that
Z(1)
Z(2)
∈ (1, (1 − δ)−1) and the all-pay auction is more
efficient for Z(1)
Z(2)
∈ ((1−δ)−1,∞). In particular, for any given continuous joint
distribution of (ZA, ZB), for sufficiently large δ the tug-or-war is more efficient
than the all-pay auction.
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4 Conclusions
We studied the strategic behavior of players who compete in a series of single
battles for two positive winner prizes. A sufficient lead in the number of battle
victories is needed to win the final prize. We showed that there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in Markov strategies and we characterized this
equilibrium. Contest effort concentrates on at most two states. Such states are
characterized by three factors: the number of battle victories, or the ’distance’
which the two contestants need to win the overall contest, the relative strength
or dominance of contestants, and the discount factor. The critical distance
that determines the tipping states in which the contest effort is focussed turns
out to be a function of the contestants’ relative strengths (or, equivalently, in
the relative valuations of the prize from final victory) and the discount factor.
The larger one player’s dominance in strength, the higher must be this player’s
distance to final victory, compared to the other player’s distance.
Many animal species and economic institutions have developed mechan-
isms such as hierarchies, or other organizational structures to govern the al-
location of prizes, such as preferential food access and the right to reproduce
in the biological context, or prized jobs and contracts in the organizational
context. Behavior in these mechanisms could be interpreted as a conflict that
consists of a series of battles, or repeated opportunities to struggle. Our results
help explain why these structures may have evolved. The tug-of-war delays
the allocation of a given prize, compared to a single stage conflict, but can
considerably increase the efficiency of allocation of the prize and reduce the
overall resources that are dissipated among the group of players.
5 Appendix
Consider a tug-of-war with m ≥ 3 and j0 ∈ {2, ...,m − 1} with the property
that δj0ZA < δ
m−j0ZB and δ
j0−1ZA > δ
m−(j0−1)ZB. Then the Markov perfect
equilibrium characterized in the Proposition 1 is unique in the class of Markov
perfect equilibria.
We will demonstrate the uniqueness of continuation values for every state j.
For given state-contingent continuation values we have already argued that the
problem reduces to a standard all-pay auction for both players at each interior
state. Hence, uniqueness results from the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the
standard two-player all-pay auction with complete information.
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Our proof will start by assuming that m ≥ 3 and j0 ∈ {2, ...m− 1}. (The
case of m = 2 corresponds trivially to the all-pay auction.) We claim the
following:
Claim 8 In any Markov perfect equilibrium, for all k ≤ j0−1, vB(k) = 0 and
for all k ≤ j0 − 2, vA(k) = δkZA.
Proof. At k = 0 by construction vA(0) = ZA and vB(0) = 0, so the claim
holds for k = 0. Since ZA ≥ ZB and m ≥ 3, from (9) evaluated at k = 2
it follows that J(0) = ZA > max(δ
2ZA, δ
m−2ZB) ≥ vA(2) + vB(2) = J(2).
Hence from (i) zA(1) > zB(1) and from (3) and (4) vA(1) = δ[ZA− vB(2)] and
vB(1) = 0. It immediately follows that J(1) = δ[ZA − vB(2)]. This implies
that the claim holds when j0 = 2, which by definition of j0 implies thatm = 3.
So assume that j0 ∈ {3, ...m−1}. We will now prove the claim by induction
on k. Suppose that for some k, 1 ≤ k ≤ j0 − 2, vB(l) = 0 for all l ≤ k and
vA(l) = δ
lZA for all l ≤ k− 1. (Note that the supposition holds for k = 1) We
claim that vA(k) = δ
kZA and vB(k + 1) = 0.
To demonstrate this observe that by (5)
vA(k) = δvA(k+1)+max(0, δ[(vA(k−1)+vB(k−1))−(vA(k+1)+vB(k+1))])
Since vB(k) = 0, by (6) zB(k)−zA(k) = δ[(vA(k+1)+vB(k+1))− (vA(k−
1) + vB(k − 1))] ≤ 0, which implies by (iii) that
vA(k) = δ[vA(k − 1) + vB(k − 1))− vB(k + 1)] = δ[δk−1ZA − vB(k + 1)]
Moreover, vB(k+1) = δvB(k)+δmax(0, (vA(k+2)+vB(k+2))− (vA(k)+
vB(k))) = δmax(0, (vA(k + 2) + vB(k + 2))− δ[δk−1ZA − vB(k + 1)]).
Suppose by way of contradiction that vB(k + 1) > 0. Then vB(k + 1) =
δ[vA(k + 2) + vB(k + 2) − δ(δk−1ZA) + δvB(k + 1)] > 0,which implies that
vA(k + 2) + vB(k + 2) − δkZA = (δ−1 − δ)vB(k + 1) > 0. However, by (9)
vA(k+ 2) + vB(k+2) ≤ max(δk+2ZA, δm−(k+2)ZB). Moreover, by definition of
j0, δ
j0−1ZA > δ
m−(j0−1)ZB, which, since k + 2 ≤ j0, implies that δk+2−1ZA >
δm−(k+2)+1ZB, or δ
kZA > δ
m−(k+2)ZB. This in turn implies that vA(k + 2) +
vB(k + 2) ≤ max(δk+2ZA, δm−(k+2)ZB) < δkZA,contradicting the claim that
vA(k+2)+ vB(k+2)− δkZA = (δ−1− δ)vB(k+1) > 0 Hence, vB(k+1) = 0,
which immediately implies that vA(k) = δvA(k − 1) = δkZA.
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This induction argument therefore shows for all k ≤ j0− 1, vB(k) = 0 and
for all k ≤ j0 − 2, vA(k) = δkZA. An immediate consequence is that
vA(j0 − 1) = δ[(vA(j0 − 2) + vB(j0 − 2))− vB(j0)] = δ[δj0−2ZA− vB(j0)] (25)
This equation will be used in the continuation to derive values at j0 − 1 and
j0.
To address equilibrium behavior in states greater than or equal to j0,we
start in state m. Note that since m is a terminal state vB(m) = ZB and
vA(m) = 0.If j0 = m − 1, then by definition δm−1ZA < δZB and δm−2ZA >
δ2ZB.Moreover, by Claim 1 vB(m−2) = 0 and by (25) vA(m−2) = δm−2ZA−
δvB(m− 1). Hence,
vA(m− 1) = δvA(m) + δmax(0, vA(m− 2) + vB(m− 2)− vA(m)− vB(m))
= 0 + δmax(0, J(m− 2)− ZB)
≤ δmax(0,max(δm−2ZA, δ2ZB)− ZB)
≤ 0
where the final inequality follows from the fact that δm−2ZA = δ
j0−1ZA <
δm−j0−1ZB = δ
m−(m−1)−1ZB = ZB. Hence, vA(m− 1) = 0. It follows that
vB(m−1) = δvB(m−2)+δmax(0, ZB−vA(m−2)−vB(m−2)) = δ(ZB−vA(m−2))
Hence,
vA(m− 2) = δm−2ZA − δvB(m− 1) and
vB(m− 1) = δ(ZB − vA(m− 2))
Solving simultaneously implies
vA(m− 2) =
δm−2ZA − δ2ZB
1− δ2
> 0
and
vB(m− 1) =
δZB − δm−1ZA
1− δ2
> 0
where both inequalities follow from j0 = m− 1.
This completes the case for j0 = m− 1. So suppose j0 ∈ {3, ...,m− 2} and
look at k > j0.
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Claim 9 In any subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary Markov strategies,
for all k ≥ j0, vA (k) = 0 and for all k ≥ j0 + 1, vB(k) = δm−kZB.
Proof. By an argument similar to that above, vB(m) = ZB and vA(m) = 0
imply J(m) > J(m−2), which in turn implies vA(m−1) = 0+δmax(0, J(m−
2)− ZB) = 0.
Suppose now that for some k, j0 + 1 ≤ k < m, vA(l) = 0 for all l ≥ k and
vB(l) = δ
m−lZB for all l ≥ k + 1. We will now demonstrate that this implies
that vB(k) = δm−kZB and vA(k − 1) = 0. Since the supposition holds for
k = m− 1, this will then prove claim 2 by induction.
So assume that for some k, j0 + 1 ≤ k < m, vA(l) = 0 for all l ≥ k
and vB(l) = δm−lZB for all l ≥ k + 1. Since vA(k) = 0, we know that
vA(k − 1) + vB(k − 1)− vA(k + 1)− vB(k + 1) ≤ 0, so that
vB(k) = δvB(k − 1) + δmax(0, vA(k + 1) + vB(k + 1)− vA(k − 1)− vB(k − 1))
= δ[vA(k + 1) + vB(k + 1)− vA(k − 1)]
= δ[δm−(k+1)ZB − vA(k − 1)]
Moreover, vA(k−1) = δvA(k)+δmax(0, vA(k−2)+vB(k−2)−vA(k)−vB(k)).
Since vA(k) = 0 by assumption and vB(k) = δ
m−kZB − δvA(k − 1), we have
vA(k − 1) = δmax(0, vA(k − 2) + vB(k − 2)− δm−kZB + δvA(k − 1)). Suppose
by way of contradiction that vA(k − 1) > 0. Then
vA(k − 1) = δ[vA(k − 2) + vB(k − 2)− δm−kZB + δvA(k − 1)] > 0.
or
vA(k − 1)[δ−1 − δ] = vA(k − 2) + vB(k − 2)− δm−kZB > 0.
where the last expression is greater than zero because δ < 1.
However, from equation (9), vA(k−2)+vB(k−2) ≤ max(δk−2ZA, δm−k+2ZB).
Since k ≥ j0 + 1 implies k − 2 ≥ j0 − 1, and by definition of j0, δj0ZA <
δm−j0ZB, we know δ
j0−1ZA < δ
m−j0−1ZB, and hence δ
k−2ZA ≤ δj0−1ZA <
δm−j0−1ZB ≤ δm−kZB. Hence, since both δk−2ZA and δm−k+2ZB are strictly
less than δm−kZB, we have a contradiction to vA(k−2)+vB(k−2)−δm−kZB > 0.
Hence, vA(k − 1) = 0. It immediately follows that vB(k) = δm−kZB.
We have hence showed by induction that for every k ≥ j0, vA(k) = 0 and
for every k ≥ j0 + 1, vB(k) = δm−kZB. An immediate consequence is that
vB(j0) = δvB(j0−1)+δmax(0, vB(j0+1)+vA(j0+1)−vA(j0−1)−vB(j0−1))
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Since vA(j0) = 0 implies J(j0 − 1) − J(j0 + 1) ≤ 0, the maximand in the
expression is nonnegative and
(7) vB(j0) = δ[vB(j0 + 1) + vA(j0 + 1)− vA(j0 − 1)]
= δ[δm−(j0+1)ZB − vA(j0 − 1)]
Since from (25) vA(j0 − 1) = δ[δj0−2ZA − vB(j0)], we have a system of two
linearly independent equations in two unknowns. These have a unique solution
which is
vA(j0 − 1) =
δj0−1ZA − δm−j0+1ZB
1− δ2
> 0
vB(j0) =
δm−j0ZB − δj0ZA
1− δ2
> 0
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